Я пытаюсь настроить MyWebPage, который основан на шаблоне https://html5up.net/, то, что я изо всех сил пытаюсь не зарекомендовать заголовок «Публикация» со страницы: https://rubencioak.github.io/research.html, ниже, код с этой страницы. Запрашивая CHATGPT, но его ответы не сработали. < /p> Любая помощь была бы очень оценена.
Rubén Pérez-Sanz
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In an environment with high coverage of collective agreements, unions and employers
in large firms are able set the level of minimum wages that fit them best in terms
of wages, and unemployment, because they can drive competitors out of the market,
having detrimental effects on small firms. This paper develops a structural search and
matching model with two-sided heterogeneity, minimum wages, and collective bargaining
negotiations. The model is tested on Spanish data to explain why unions, and
surprisingly employers are willing to raise the minimum wage: because the gain labour
market power. In a nutshell, the rise in the minimum wage level causes costs increases
that push small firms out of the market, or leads them to fire workers not productive
enough to pay for the minimum wage; large firms are not so much affected but enjoy a
new stock of unemployed at their disposal and find it easier to fill vacancies; furthermore
employed workers have less alternative offers to bring the current employers into
competition for their services and be granted a pay raise. In a counterfactual exercise,
I show that in environments of low unemployment workers and employers would be
willing to raise the minimum wage level. A social planner would promote representation
of unions and employers in small firms to set the minimum wage level, and so reduce externalities.
Working Papers
Women’s Voice at Work and Family-Friendly FirmsWith Jose Garcia-Louzao
Uneven family responsibilities are at the root of gender gaps. Using a new dataset covering
all firm-level agreements signed in Spain between 2010 and 2018, we explore whether
the presence of female worker representatives can facilitate the negotiation of family-friendly
policies with management. We compare firms that operate under the same set of labor
regulations but differ in the presence of women among employee representatives. Our
findings suggest that having female representatives at the bargaining table can help
transform workplaces to better meet women’s needs and ultimately close the gender gap.
Collective Bargaining Agreements and Worker Outcomes: Evidence from the 2012 Spanish Labor Market ReformWith Emil Bustos
Abstract
After a historical major Spanish labour market reform in 2012, we find that the reduction
of severance payments and the setting of new contracts that facilitated contracting
were the most decisive policies to create jobs in the long term, despite wage cuts.
On the contrary, we find that policies related to collective bargaining, such as
firm-level priority in collective contracts, ultra-activity, and opt-out requirements
did not have an impact on job creation or wages. We derive these results by exploiting
two datasets: the first one, MCVL, has information about the complete employment
histories of workers and their monthly wages. The second, REGCON, has thorough information
about the clauses negotiated in collective agreements. By following workers with
collective contracts signed before and after the reform, we are able to measure
the effect of the reform on jobs and wages for the different policies enacted.
Я пытаюсь настроить MyWebPage, который основан на шаблоне https://html5up.net/, то, что я изо всех сил пытаюсь не зарекомендовать заголовок «Публикация» со страницы: https://rubencioak.github.io/research.html, ниже, код с этой страницы. Запрашивая CHATGPT, но его ответы не сработали. < /p> [b] Любая помощь была бы очень оценена.
Rubén Pérez-Sanz
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In an environment with high coverage of collective agreements, unions and employers in large firms are able set the level of minimum wages that fit them best in terms of wages, and unemployment, because they can drive competitors out of the market, having detrimental effects on small firms. This paper develops a structural search and matching model with two-sided heterogeneity, minimum wages, and collective bargaining negotiations. The model is tested on Spanish data to explain why unions, and surprisingly employers are willing to raise the minimum wage: because the gain labour market power. In a nutshell, the rise in the minimum wage level causes costs increases that push small firms out of the market, or leads them to fire workers not productive enough to pay for the minimum wage; large firms are not so much affected but enjoy a new stock of unemployed at their disposal and find it easier to fill vacancies; furthermore employed workers have less alternative offers to bring the current employers into competition for their services and be granted a pay raise. In a counterfactual exercise, I show that in environments of low unemployment workers and employers would be willing to raise the minimum wage level. A social planner would promote representation of unions and employers in small firms to set the minimum wage level, and so reduce externalities.
[/list]
Working Papers
[list]
[*] Women’s Voice at Work and Family-Friendly Firms[/b] [i]With Jose Garcia-Louzao [/i][b]
Uneven family responsibilities are at the root of gender gaps. Using a new dataset covering all firm-level agreements signed in Spain between 2010 and 2018, we explore whether the presence of female worker representatives can facilitate the negotiation of family-friendly policies with management. We compare firms that operate under the same set of labor regulations but differ in the presence of women among employee representatives. Our findings suggest that having female representatives at the bargaining table can help transform workplaces to better meet women’s needs and ultimately close the gender gap.
[*] Collective Bargaining Agreements and Worker Outcomes: Evidence from the 2012 Spanish Labor Market Reform[/b] [i]With Emil Bustos[/i][b]
Abstract
After a historical major Spanish labour market reform in 2012, we find that the reduction of severance payments and the setting of new contracts that facilitated contracting were the most decisive policies to create jobs in the long term, despite wage cuts. On the contrary, we find that policies related to collective bargaining, such as firm-level priority in collective contracts, ultra-activity, and opt-out requirements did not have an impact on job creation or wages. We derive these results by exploiting two datasets: the first one, MCVL, has information about the complete employment histories of workers and their monthly wages. The second, REGCON, has thorough information about the clauses negotiated in collective agreements. By following workers with collective contracts signed before and after the reform, we are able to measure the effect of the reform on jobs and wages for the different policies enacted.
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